Pilz PNOZ s50 C - Manual (Page 10)

Safety
Operating Manual PNOZ s50
1002194­EN­02 10
3 Safety
3.1 Intended use
The PWM relay PNOZ s50 is designed for use in safety­related applications.
The device meets the requirements of EN ISO 13849­1 up to PL e and EN IEC 62061 up to
SIL CL 3. For example, it is designed for use with
} Mechanical holding brakes.
} Valves.
Intended use includes making the electrical installation EMC­compliant. The product is de­
signed for use in an industrial environment. It is not suitable for use in a domestic environ­
ment, as this can lead to interference.
The following is deemed improper use in particular:
} Any component, technical or electrical modification to the product
} Use of the product outside the areas described in this manual
} Use of the product outside the technical details (see chapter entitled “Technical De­
tails”)
Please note the following safety guidelines:
Hazard analysis
} The machine manufacturer must produce a hazard analysis for the machine. He must
take appropriate measures to ensure that unexpected movements do not lead to haz­
ardous situations for either people or equipment.
Demands on the safety control system
} The PNOZ s50 may only be operated in conjunction with a higher level safety control
system.
} The outputs on the safety control system used to activate fast shutdown must be tested
to detect shorts across contacts and earth faults.
} The fault signal output O3 must be evaluated together with status outputs O4 (if O1+/
O1­ is used) and O5 (if O2+/O2­ is used), if this is demanded by the plant/machine's
safety requirements. Processing of these signals is used to check the feasibility of the
signal states. Evaluation of these signals must be suitable to achieve a safe condition
for the application.
Demands on the connected, inductive load
} The inductive load must guarantee the demands on the safety function in a de­ener­
gised state. For example, in a de­energised state a connected safe brake must always
be applied, must stop a hazardous movement and must prevent unintended start­up.
Slow shutdown in the event of a fault
} When designing a safe application, you should consider that a slow shutdown instead
of a fast shutdown may be effective in the event of a fault. A connected brake may have
a longer stopping distance.
Slow shutdown
} The power circuit's slow shutdown is not safety­related. It may only be used when per­
mitted by the hazard analysis.