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Generating local dsa or rsa key pairs, Configuring urpf, Overview – H3C Technologies H3C S12500-X Series Switches User Manual

Page 246: Urpf check modes, Urpf operation

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Configuring uRPF

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Overview

Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF) protects a network against source address spoofing attacks, such

as DoS and DDoS attacks.
Attackers send packets with a forged source address to access a system that uses IP-based authentication,

in the name of authorized users or even the administrator. Even if the attackers or other hosts cannot

receive any response packets, the attacks are still disruptive to the attacked target.

Figure 75 Source address spoofing attack

As shown in

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Figure 75

, an attacker on Router A sends the server (Router B) requests with a forged source

IP address 2.2.2.1 at a high rate, and Router B sends response packets to IP address 2.2.2.1 (Router C).

Consequently, both Router B and Router C are attacked. If the administrator disconnects Router C by
mistake, the network service is interrupted.
Attackers can also send packets with different forged source addresses or attack multiple servers

simultaneously to block connections or even break down the network.
uRPF can prevent these source address spoofing attacks. It checks whether an interface that receives a
packet is the output interface of the FIB entry that matches the source address of the packet. If not, uRPF

considers it a spoofing attack and discards the packet.

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uRPF check modes

uRPF supports strict and loose modes.
Strict uRPF check—To pass strict uRPF check, the source address of a packet and the receiving interface

must match the destination address and output interface of a FIB entry. In some scenarios (for example,

asymmetrical routing), strict uRPF might discard valid packets. Strict uRPF is often deployed between a PE
and a CE.
Loose uRPF check—To pass loose uRPF check, the source address of a packet must match the destination

address of a FIB entry. Loose uRPF can avoid discarding valid packets, but might let go attack packets.

Loose uRPF is often deployed between ISPs, especially in asymmetrical routing.

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uRPF operation

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Figure 76

shows how uRPF works.