Konica Minolta BIZHUB 920 User Manual

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22 FMT_MSA.1 FPT_RVM.1 FMT_MOF.1

23 FMT_MSA.3 FPT_RVM.1 FMT_MOF.1

24 FMT_MOF.1 FPT_RVM.1

25 FMT_SMF.1 None

FMT_MOF.1

26 FMT_SMR.1 None

FMT_MOF.1

27 FPT_RVM.1

FMT_MOF.1

28 FPT_STM.1 None

None

29 FDP_MTD.1 FPT_RVM.1 FMT_MOF.1

FPT_RVM.1

When the management function and CE function of the TOE is used, the administrator and CE

execute the identification and authentication (FIA_UID.2, FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UAU.7, FIA_AFL.1).

The document data of User BOX is accessed according to the access control (FDP_ACC.1[1] [2]

and FDP_ACF.1[1][2]).

The audit data is always captured. (FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_STG.4)

Only the administrator can refer the audit data.(FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2, and FAU_STG.1)

Only the user who is applicable to each data can operate the miscellaneous TSF data and

administrator data.(FAU_SAR.2, FMT_MTD.1[1]-[5], FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_

MOF.1, and FDP_MTD.1)

The detour is prevented because the avobe mentioned matters are certainly executed in FPT_

RVM.1.

FMT_MOF.1

The prevention of deactivation in TSF is realized by making the security reinforcement mode to

be valid in FMT_MOF.1.

In this TOE, the access control is only for the User BOX of HDD1.

The unauthorized subject does not exist because the access control to User BOX is limited to the

process through the operation panel. Therefore, FPT_SEP.1 is unnecessary because there is no room

for the unauthorized subject to enter.

8.2.4. Consistency of Security Function Strength to Security Objectives Policies

This TOE assumes the attack capability of general user to be low level in “2. TOE Description”,

and describes “operate from the operation panel” or “connect unauthorized reading device with

HDD” in “3. TOE Security Environment”, namely, the especially highly skilled attacker is not